Torpedo Rules

[invisible officer]

You compare training results with real life ones.   In reality the British Aerial torpedo had no bigger chance than other nations. These had own systems, mostly optical ones.

In the many attacks by British torpedo planes against the Kriegsmarine in Channel and Biskaya the hitting rate was not impressive. Similar  to Luftwaffe pilots most got nervous by AA fire, launching early.

In Murmansk run the Luftwaffe thought to have hit much more, caculating with data from training results.

 

[Eumerin]

?

The reason why the USN could stay at Pearl Harbor had nothing to do with torpedoes. It’s because the Japanese were focused on crippling the ships, and put less emphasis on the infrastructure – particularly the oil storage tanks. That would have been a dive bomber thing. And the reasons that caused the Japanese to deprioritize the tanks were just as likely to occur no matter who performed the attack.

Ignoring the oil storage tanks wouldn’t have mattered if the carriers had been caught in port during the attack, which is no doubt why the IJN didn’t put emphasis on them.

[boomboom517]

Mostly talking about the physical systems i.e the wire spool and to a very limited extent the wooden find which made Toronto the only completely sucessful harbour raid by carrier aircraft of the war that I am aware of, in game torpedoes are very hard to hit with and it’s difficult to replicate the historic 50% hit rate at Toronto hit rate at pearl is easier a little to high on average but since their are no shallow water drop rules yet can’t quite complain there, as to the fuel tanks at pearl that is a separate doctrinal issue put simply British doctrine would have made those tanks a priority target and the loss of fuel would have made filling the new underground tanks a multi year nightmare pushing the fleet back to San Fran and their survival is the single biggest factor in the total failure of the pearl harbour attack in my opinion.

[invisible officer]

The attack on Tarento was far away from completely successfull.   Six Battleships in harbor, only  three hit. Two back in service in 4 and 6 months.   Two = a third of the Italian battleships ready for action,   are not affected.

They tried bombing the oil depot too and failed totally.

 

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Well, with an attack on Toronto they might have more success.       I guess some auto repair system does that typo in your posts.

 

In Channel we have some Torpedo raids on harbors by carrier type torpedo planes from land bases, not very bright  too.

• This reply was modified 3 years, 7 months ago by invisible officer.

[Nat]

The biggest impact of the tarento raid wasnt the material damage but rather the psychological effects.  At Pearl Harbour the psychological effects had the opposite effect and instead of making the US fearful of the Japanese it made them angry / venganceful

[Eumerin]

It probably helped that Pearl Harbor was out of reach of the IJN outside of an extraordinary (and extremely risky) effort. That succeeded in December, 1941, but at that point the Americans hadn’t yet realized that they were about to enter a war, and thus weren’t on their guard. Subsequent attacks against Hawaii required closer bases, such as Midway. Until such a base was available, ordinary precautions – which had been neglected prior to the attack – would likely have sufficed if the Japanese had been daring enough to try another raid on the port. Also, even if a Japanese fleet did manage to attack the harbor again, it would have been at the very end of its logistical chain, and in danger of getting cut off when it attempted to return to friendly waters.

Taranto, on the other hand, was right up against the Med, and well within the normal operational range of the Royal Navy. As such, taking precautions against another potential surprise airstrike made sense. It was risky to put a carrier within range of Italian land-based aircraft. But it wouldn’t require any particular extraordinary effort to conduct further raids of the type.

Of course, in a counter-example, it’s useful to note that when the US returned the favor to the Japanese with the Doolittle Raid (which did very little practical damage, but was a complete surprise and a psychological blow), the Japanese overreacted in their attempt to prevent any such raids in the future.

[invisible officer]

Strategical the Tarento attack was just one part of M.B. 8.   Five convois under protection of all Med RN fleet. The Italians did not gain a picture of all that and so the battlesips stayed in harbor. The Italian air force was scattered and many recce planes got shot down.

Illustrious first role was to support the fleet in Eastern Med.  . The raid came second.

The run to the starting point was not so risky as it seems.  With the Italians totally confused it was safe from attack. (And with the long range of japanese planes the Pearl Harbour starting point was safe  too, the USN could not find them. Not knowing at that date that it was double the range of US planes)

 

The psychological effect of the raid was not big, just two weeks later 2 Italian battleships fought at Cap Teulada. Again the air recce was poor. The less than an hour fight showed both sides not willing to fight it out.

Both harbour attacks had been spectacular. But most ships could be repaired, not like with a BB sunk outside. And, apart from Arizona, the losses in trained personal had been much lighter than in a sea battle with a similar number of sinkings.

 

 

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